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RECOVERY OF STOLEN MONEY OR NEGOTI-
ABLE INSTRUMENT FROM HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE. IS THERE AN INDIANA RULE?
C. SEVERIN BUSCHMANN AND LEO l. GARDNER*
It has long been considered necessary for practical business
transactions that one who receives money in due course of busi-
ness shall not be put on inquiry as to the title of the one paying
the same. The reason frequently assigned is that money bears
no earmarks, and therefore cannot be traced. But this argument
is not tenable, for in many states we find that even though the
money can be traced directly into the payee's hand, still no re-
covery may be had even though the money has been stolen,
unless the person receiving the money took the same in bad faith.
The real reason for such decision lies in the fact that money
constitutes the currency of the nation, and by its use a civilized
community is carried beyond the stage of barter.
Modern business usage has resulted in many paper transac-
tions where no money or other medium of exchange is trans-
ferred at all, the greater portion being done by bookkeeping
entries. Without the use of money or some other medium of
exchange, commercial transactions would have to be carried on
by means of barter and exchange such as existed in those times
which are among the earliest recorded periods of civilization.
If it were necessary for every creditor receiving payment of his
indebtedness or every seller of goods to inquire as to whether
or not the party paying him or buying the goods from him had
good title to the money with which he attempts to discharge
his obligations or carry out the purchase, business transactions
would be seriously hampered. The suggestion that a person
from whom money has been stolen might walk into any one
of our large banks and by identifying such money secure the
possession of the same, would seem startling. Any such propo-
sition would be regarded as sufficient to upset modern business
methods. Our system of banking would undoubtedly go through
an immediate readjustment. As amazing as this proposition
may seem, there are cases in the Supreme and Appellate Courts
* See p. 207 for biographical notes.
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of Indiana which involve variations of the above principle.,
Much of the difficulty arising from the situation above described
is due to the case of Porter v. Roseman, decided in 1905.2 An
examination of the facts of this case, the decision in which mili-
tates against the monetary history of the world, discloses a lack
of proper analysis and a misconception of the legal principles
involved, as well as the fundamental reasons for applying dif-
ferent rules to money or other medium of exchange than is
applied to chattels.
In the case of Porter v. Roseman, we find the following facts:
One Mount executed eight notes of $20 each to the plaintiff who
lived in New York. The plaintiff deposited them in his New
York bank for collection, which bank sent them to an Elwood
bank, as agent of the plaintiff, where Mount paid them with
money belonging to the defendant, his employer. The plaintiff
had no knowledge of the ownership of the money used, although
it appeared that previous to the execution of the notes $35 real-
ized from the sale of certain property of defendant had been paid
to the plaintiff by Mount to the knowledge of plaintiff. It ap-
pears that the money used by Mount to pay the note had been
stolen from the defendant. Apparently realizing the difficulty
of recovering the money in New York, the defendant purchased
goods from the plaintiff and refused to pay for the same. The
plaintiff then came to Indiana and sued upon the account, to
which suit the defendant set off the amount of money which
Mount had taken from him. The lower court permitted a set-off
as to the $35 which plaintiff's agent knew belonged to the em-
ployer, but refused to allow a set-off as to the balance. The
Supreme Court, in reversing the opinion of the lower court as
1 In the case of Stiefel & Levy v. Farmers State Bank of Stroh (1929)
- Ind. App. _-, 168 N. E. 30, the facts show that one Bower issued two
checks payable to the order of the Farmers State Bank of Stroh, drawn
on the Farmers Bank later consolidated with the Peoples State Bank, in
payment of certain notes. Stiefel & Levy sued to recover the amount of
said checks from the Farmers State Bank of Stroh on the ground that
Bower had no authority to issue checks for his personal indebtedness out
of money deposited in his own name at the Peoples State Bank, for the
reason that Stiefel & Levy had supplied the money under an agreement
whereby the title was to remain in them. The court found it unnecessary
to pass upon the applicability of Porter v. Roseman and Peoples State Bank
v. Kelly infra, on the ground that their action was barred by complete
laches. This decision was handed down September 25, 1929.
2 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105.
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to the balance of the stolen money, held that Mount acquired
no title by the conversion and could transfer no better title than
he himself possessed, that the receipt of it by the plaintiff was a
conversion, as to which its good faith and innocence afforded
no protection against the rightful owner. The court said it
made no difference whether or not plaintiff knew whose money
it was. Defendant therefore was allowed to set off the amount
of the money converted by Mount. The case is an anomaly. It
is a stramonium in the garden of judicial decisions. Its influ-
ence has been revealed in at least one decision of the Appellate
Court, although the majority opinion is not concurred in by one
vigorous dissenter.3
Admittedly unsupported as it is by precedent either from our
decisions or those of a sister state,4 it is interesting to analyze
the case. The court relies on three decisions as supporting the
proposition that Mount acquired no title by the conversion and
transferred no better title than he himself possessed. The first
case is that of Alexander v. Swackhamer, decided in 1886.5
In that case, the defrauded seller of cattle, believing that he was
dealing with a firm when in fact he was not, was allowed to
recover in conversion from a good faith taker upon the theory
that the contract was wholly void. The next case cited by
the court is the case of Shearer v. Evans, decided in 1883. 6 There
the court held that a person who innocently bought stolen per-
sonal property from a thief, acquired no title thereto. The
property stolen in that case was wheat. The third case referred
to is that of Breckenridge v. McAfee, decided in 1876.7 This
case holds that a person obtaining wheat by larceny obtains
3 Peoples State Bank v. Kelly (1922), 78 Ind. App. 418, 136 N. E. 30.
4 While the great weight of authority is contrary to the case of Porter
v. Roseman, there are a few states which are in accord. Some of the cases
in accord with the great weight of authority are set out in a note in 25 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 631. See also Friend & Terry Lumber Co. v. De Vine, et al.
(1921) 50 Cal. App. 102, 194 Pac. 754. In the case of Agard v. Peoples
National Bank (1927), 169 Minn. 438, 211 N. W. 825, the court cites Porter
v. Roseman but remarks that the great weight of authority is probably the
other way. This case involved the appropriation of the principal's bank
deposit standing in the name of the agent for an indebtedness of the agent.
The case of Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Savings Bank (1914), 34 S. Dak. 109,
147 N. W. 288, is another appropriation of deposit case which approves of
Porter v. Roseman.
5 105 Ind. 81, 4 N. E. 433.
6 89 Ind. 400.
7 54 Ind. 141.
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no title thereto, and can confer no title upon a person to whom
he sells the same. All three of the decisions are cases involving
chattels. In addition to the cases above referred to, the court
also cited the case of Harlan v. Brown,8 which holds that where
a person obtains a non-negotiable note by fraud, his transferee
gets no better title than he himself had.
That the Supreme Court should have for guidance only the
above decisions is either due to lack of diligence of counsel, or
to a failure to distinguish between cases involving the law of
chattels and those involving money. Money was designed to
pass freely from hand to hand in commercial and industrial
transactions. The purpose of the law merchant and of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law in giving certain rights and privileges
to holders in due course of negotiable instruments, was to put
them upon the same plane of negotiability as money. They
were trying to give negotiable instruments the attributes of
money. How ridiculous then must appear the Porter v. Roseman
decision in which the chattel rule is applied.9
There are certain peculiar situations which arise as a result
of the rule announced in Porter v. Roseman. It is a familiar
rule of agency that an agent for the purpose of collecting money
has no power to accept checks, but must accept cash unless his
principal authorizes him to do so.10 Let us consider this situa-
tion in the light of the possibilities revealed by the decision in
the case of Porter v. Roseman. Suppose an agent for collection
approaches a debtor and asks for a payment on account. If
the debtor steals the money from his employer and pays it to
the agent for collection, the same could be recovered under
Porter v. Rosenan. Suppose, however, that the agent for col-
lection, when he made application to the debtor for payment,
had received from him certain checks payable to bearer, which
checks were taken out of the cash drawer of the debtor's em-
ployer. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law adopted in
8 (1892) 4 Ind. App. 319, 323, 30 N. E. 928.
9 In commenting on Porter v. Roseman, the annotator of the case of
First National Bank of Birmingham v. Gibert (1909), 123 La. 846, 49 So.
593, in 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 631, 633, says: "It is very doubtful if the court
really intended to announce the foregoing doctrine in the broad terms in
which it was asserted. The decision did not require the application of this
broad doctrine and the cases cited as sustaining it related to chattels, as
to which the doctrine would, of course, be applicable."
10 Miller v. Edmonston (1846), 8 Blackf. 291; Kirk v. Hiatt (1850), 2
Ind. 322.
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Indiana in 1913, the employer who owned the checks could not
recover the amount of .money evidenced by the bearer checks
transferred to the agent for collection by the debtor. In other
words, under the Negotiable Instruments Law of Indiana, if a
bearer instrument is stolen and given to a third party in pay-
ment of the pre-existing debt, the money thereunder could not
be recovered by the original owner thereof. If, however, actual
money was transferred instead of bearer instruments, the
actual money could be recovered under the decision in Porter v.
Roseman. The decision, therefore, has reduced money to a class
below that of bearer negotiable instruments, and placed it in a
class with chattels."
The opinion in Porter v. Roseman indicates that the payment
made was simply payment of a pre-existing debt. No distinc-
tion is attempted between payment of such an indebtedness by
stolen money or negotiable paper and payment by delivering
other kind of property which is either stolen or to which the
transferor has a voidable title. It has been the almost universal
rule that a payment of a pre-existing indebtedness by stolen
money or stolen negotiable instruments defeats the right of the
true owner to recover the same in the absence of bad faith. The
reason therefor is the underlying purpose of the adoption' of
money as a medium of payment and the desirability from a
business standpoint in having a definite termination of the
transaction. 12 Any other result, if followed to its logical con-
clusion, would permit the re-opening and re-examination of pay-
ments in business dealings, completed in good faith and long
since satisfied. Under any other rule of law a creditor could
only accept payment of an existing obligation with the risk of
having the validity of the payment questioned by one claiming
to be the true owner of the money or negotiable instrument with
which payment was made. A different result is reached in those
cases where personal property other than money or negotiable
instruments is transferred to a creditor in payment only of a
pre-existing obligation. In such case, while the payment is sup-
'I This was recognized by Judge Dausman in his dissenting opinion in
the case of Peoples State Bank v. Kelly, where he says: "Money is de-
signed to pass freely from hand to hand in commercial and industrial trans-
actions. It is a circulating medium of the highest rank; but the decision
in the Porter case reduces it to a rank below that of negotiable instruments."
12 The reasoning is well set out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Mc-
Coy in Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Savings Bank, supra, where he says:
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ported by a valuable consideration, it is generally not such a
consideration as will constitute the taker a bona fide purchaser
for value so as to avoid prior equities.' 3
The Porter v. Roseman case is highly unfortunate. It is un-
supported in applying to money the qualities of chattels, with-
out realizing the principles upon which our monetary system
"The principle involved in this case is the same as if a thief or highway
robber had paid his individual pre-existing debt with stolen money, without
any notice on the part of the creditor who received it that it was stolen
money, and long thereafter the owner of the stolen money should bring suit
against such creditor to recover, not the same identical money, but a like
amount of money, claiming that the money with which such debt had been
paid was stolen money in the hands of the thief, and that the creditor had
parted with no value at the time he received such money. We are of the
opinion that the original owner from whom the money had been thus
stolen could not recover; that, when a creditor receives cash in payment
of a pre-existing debt, he is not required or bound to make inquiry as to
the manner in which such debtor obtained possession of such money."
In 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. 4th Ed. § 748, the author says:
"The rule concerning the transfer of negotiable instruments has thus
been settled avowedly in the interests of commerce and mercantile business;
these reasons do not apply to the purchase of land and chattels and non-
negotiable securities."
13 Under the law in Indiana, where there is no change of position, while
payment of a pre-existing debt is a good consideration, it is not such as to
constitute the taker a bona fide purchaser for value so as to avoid prior
equities. This was expressly held in Boling v. Howell (1883), 93 Ind. 329.
In that case it is stated as follows:
"The fact, conceding it to be the fact, that the notes were assigned to
appellee in payment of a precedent debt, does not show that there was no
valid consideration for the assignment. A precedent debt is unquestionably
a valuable consideration for a contract, but is not such a consideration as
will make a grantee or assignee a bona fide purchaser against prior equities.
Hewitt v. Powers, 84 Ind. 295; Louthain v. Miller, 85 Ind. 161; Fitzpatrick
v. Papa, 89 Ind. 17. As against one who has no prior equity, a precedent
debt will support a contract otherwise valid. In the present case it also
appears that appellee surrendered a debt not due, and extended the time
of payment of a debt not due, and this brought the case fully within the
rule laid down in Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576; Kester v. Hulman, 65
Ind. 100." (Our italics.)
The above principle has so long been established in Indiana that it is
hardly deemed necessary to cite authority therefor. In citing the Boling
v. Howell case, the Appellate Court of Indiana said in the recent case of
Heuring v. Stiefel (1926), 85 Ind. App. 102, 152 N. E. 861:
"The doctrine of these later cases is that an antecedent debt is a valu-
able consideration and will support a mortgage, but it is not such a con-
sideration as will make the mortgagee a bona fide purchaser so as to cut
off secret equities."
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is based. Fortunately, creditors and mercantile institutions of
this state and all other persons accepting money in payment of
pre-existing obligations do not realize that they are doing so at
the risk of having the true owner come against them for the
money received. Those who know of the decision nevertheless
run the risk rather than revert to medieval methods of trans-
acting business.
With this situation existing, the recent case of Peoples State
Bank v. Kelly,14 came up for decision before the Appellate Court.
All of the operative facts arose after the adoption of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, and while a check was involved in this
particular case, there is no indication from the opinion that the
question of a holder in due course of negotiable paper was
involved. The case can scarcely be considered as a well rea-
soned one. In spite of the fact that there was a dissenting
opinion, with a recommendation to transfer to the Supreme
Court, neither a petition for re-hearing nor a petition to trans-
fer was filed. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: An
officer of a corporation sold the corporate assets, deposited the
amount thereof to his credit at the appellant bank, and by check
drawn on the appellant's bank, paid his personal indebtedness
to that bank. There is no indication in the opinion of an ex-
tension of time, release of surety or other change of position
upon the part of the bank. The court, relying upon Porter V.
Roseman, held that the bank was liable to the receiver of the
corporation in an action by him to recover the amount of the
money paid to the appellant bank, although the bank did not
know of the wrong, and acted in good faith throughout the
transaction. The dissenting opinion treats the case as involving
stolen money and, after criticizing the ease of Porter v. Roseman,
points out that the decision in that case reduces money to a rank
below that of negotiable instruments.
As previously indicated, both of these cases involve stolen
money. At the most (or at their worst) they only purport to
hamper the circulation of stolen money, and not stolen negotiable
instruments. In speaking of this limited application, the Ap-
pellate Court says, in the case of Meier v. Continental National
Bank,15
"Appellant cites the case of Peoples State Bank v. Kelly, Rec. (1922),
78 Ind. App. 418, 136 N. E. 30, in support of the second reason stated, but
14 See note 3.
15 (1924) 83 Ind. App. 109, 143 N. E. 377.
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it is not controlling in the instant case, in the application of the equitable
rule involved, where one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts
of a third, as in that case, not merely a conversion was shown, as ap-
pellant states was true in this case, but the commission of a crime as well."
The decision in the Kelly case does not purport to consider
the effect of the issuance of a negotiable instrument, if in fact
the same was involved. The main defense, according to the
opinion, seems to be that the indebtedness paid was that of the
corporation, and that, therefore, they were only applying cor-
poration funds to a corporate indebtedness. Upon this proposi-
tion the decision of the trial court was conclusive. Nor is there
anything in the opinion to indicate that the bank was a holder
in due course of a negotiable instrument, if we assume that a
negotiable instrument was involved. Money is not necessarily
a negotiable instrument, although certain types of bank notes
may meet the requirements. The money may not have been
withdrawn in the usual course of business. This is indicated by
the statement of the court at page 426, as follows:
"This might have been done by showing that Zaring, who had made the
deposit as stated, withdrew the money in the usual course of business,
through checks issued to himself or third parties. Miami County Bank v.
State ex rel., (1916), 61 Ind. App. 360, 112 N. E. 40."
And later on, at page 427, in speaking of the liability of the
bank for the amount which was converted by Zaring when he
deposited the money with appellant in his own name, the court
says:
"In that event its liability would extend to the whole amount, in the
absence of evidence that it had disposed of the same under such cir-
cumstances as would exonerate it, as we have heretofore indicated. The
burden is upon appellant to establish the facts that would have that effect,
and the evidence not being conclusive in that regard we are bound by the
determination of the trial court"
While it is difficult to ascertain what the Appellate Court had
in mind in making the above statement, it would seem that
they were not convinced that the appellant bank had paid out
the money deposited in the usual course of business. If so, there
would be no occasion for considering the effect of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. The scope of the decision, therefore, should
not be extended beyond holding that when stolen or embezzled
money is applied to a pre-existing debt without more, the true
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owner can recover the same. In this connection it should be
borne in mind that under the rule laid down in Davis v. Indiana
National Bank16 if a depositor deposits trust funds in his per-
sonal account in a bank, and the bank has no knowledge of the
trust character of the funds, it may apply the deposit to the
indebtedness of the depositor to the bank without liability to
the beneficiary of the trust. 7
It is difficult to see any reason for making a distinction be-
tween the case of a deposit of trust funds and a deposit of
stolen funds. Therefore, the case of Peoples State Bank vs.
Kelly seems to be inconsistent with this well recognized rule.18
Desirable as it may seem to have Indiana place money in the
class of a circulating medium of the highest rank, the decision
seems to ignore that fact. The passages above quoted seem to
indicate that a bank would be protected if it paid out money
which had been deposited with it in the usual course of business
16 (1920) 73 Ind. App. 563, 126 N. E. 489.
17 The case of Citizens Bank v. Harrison (1890), 127 Ind. 128, 26 N. E.
683, is distinguishable from the case of Davis v. Indiana National Bank,
supra. In that case Mrs. Harrison was the owner of some wheat which
she entrusted to her husband to sell. He sold the same for $92.15, receiving
in payment therefor a check payable to himself. Mr. Harrison owed a man
by the name of Finch $5, and gave the check to Finch to collect. Finch
presented the check to the Citizens Bank, which bank gave Finch $5 and
applied the balance of the check to a past due note of Mr. Harrison's. Mrs.
Harrison, who knew nothing of the transactions, brought suit against the
bank and recovered. The case is distinguishable from the Davis v. Indiana
National Bank case in that it involves a banker's right of set-off, which
cannot be invoked because there was no relation of debtor and creditor be-
tween the customer and the bank.
18Newhall v. Wyatt (1893), 139 N. Y. 452, 34 N. E. 1045. In that
case the court said:
"In the case cited the plaintiff contended that his money had been
virtually stolen, and could be followed and regained until it reached the
hands of an innocent party, giving at the time a valuable consideration
therefor, and that the discharge of a precedent debt was insufficient to
afford protection against the true owner. This court refused to accede to
that doctrine, arguing that money has no earmark; that, while the pur-
chaser of a chattel or chose in action may generally ascertain the title of his
vendor, that is not so as to money, the title to which in the possessor can-
not usually be traced to its source; and that no case had been referred to
in which the doctrine that an antecedent debt is not a sufficient considera-
tion to cut off certain equities had been applied to money received in good
faith and the ordinary course of business in payment of a debt; and that
such a rule would obviously introduce confusion and danger into all com-
mercial dealings."
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through checks issued to the depositor or third parties, even
though the money was stolen. This seems to be a misapplication
of the chattel rule which the court has been following. It is
well settled that in case of a stolen chattel resold by the buyer
in good faith without any knowledge of the theft prior to notice
of the true owner's claim, such owner can hold the buyer in
conversion even though the stolen chattel simply passed in and
out of his hands in good faith before the action was brought.19
In that sense the Peoples State Bank v. Kelly decision seems to
recognize the proposition undoubtedly prevalent in the minds of
the ordinary business men of this state, that one is protected
who has given present value for stolen money, or who has dis-
posed of such stolen money in good faith and in such a way as
to amount to a change of position. If such is the purport of
the decision, it does not blindly follow Porter v. Roseman,
although the dissenter seems to think that they were merely fol-
lowing that case.
In connection with a study of these few cases, it is interesting
to review the opinion of Lord Mansfield rendered in 1758 in
the case of Miller v. Race.20 In this case one Finney possessed
a note payable to himself or bearer on demand. By reason of a
robbery, the note was lost and later reached the hands of the
plaintiff, who received it for a valuable consideration without
knowledge of the fact that it was stolen. In the meanwhile,
Finney learned of the robbery and wrote to the bank of England
to have payment stopped on the note. When the note was later
presented, payment was refused, and the teller retained the
note. Plaintiff thereupon sued and recovered judgment, but a
question of law as to whether or not, under these circumstances,
the plaintiff had any right to recover was reserved. Lord Mans-
field, the English judge who had so much to do with the estab-
lishment of the law of negotiable instruments, heard the case
and arguments, and the reporter makes this interesting comment
19In Robinson v. Skipworth (1864), 23 Ind. 311, Robinson bought a
stolen horse at public auction, kept him for several months and sold him
in good faith, without notice of plaintiff's claim or knowledge that the
horse had been stolen, but he was held liable to the plaintiff for the value
thereof. In the case of Peoples State Bank v. Kelly, supra, the court,
while following the chattel rule, urged the conclusion that the bank re-
ceiving the stolen money would not be liable if it paid out the same in due
course of business to the depositor or to third parties. Accord, Sharp v.
Parks (1868), 48 II 511.
20 1 Burr. 457, 97 Eng. Rep. 398.
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immediately prior to what he sets out as the decision of the
court. This comment reads as follows:
"Upon this argument on Friday last Lord Mansfield then said that
Sir Richard Lloyd had argued it so ingeniously that though he had no doubt
about the matter it might be proper to look into the cases he had cited in
order to give a proper answer to them and therefore the court deferred
giving opinion to this day. But at the same time Lord Mansfield said he
would not wish to have it understood in the city that the court had any
doubt about the point."
In Porter v. Roseman, it is not specified as to whether bank
notes were stolen or actual coin money. In the case of Miller v.
Race, a bank note was involved, and the contention urged by the
defendant was that there was a distinction between bank notes
and ordinary coin money in that as to coin money it passed
freely from hand to hand, and whoever had it in good faith
and for valuable consideration had title thereto, but whoever
had the bank note, if they did not get the same from one who
possessed title, did not have such a title as would prevent recov-
ery. Lord Mansfield, according to the ,reporter, did not wish it
understood in the City of London that he had any doubt what-
soever, but that title had been conveyed to the bank note, even
though it had been stolen from its true owner. He did not wish
to inject into commercial transactions any such element of doubt
or uncertainty as had been injected into the commercial trans-
actions of this state by the decisions in the cases of Porter v.
Roseman and Peoples State Bank v. Kelly. It would be indeed
fortunate if our court could reconsider the principles announced
in these two cases, overrule those decisions, and establish firmly
a sound principle of commercial law in accordance with that
announced by Lord Mansfield as early as 1758 and concurred in
by the great weight of authority.
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